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  The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster presented a familiar 
scenario from a risk perception standpoint. It combined a classic 
“dread risk” (radioactivity), a punctuating event (the disaster 
itself), and resultant stigmatization (involving worldwide 
repercussions for nuclear power). Some nuclear nations 
curtailed nuclear power generation, and decades-old opposition 
to nuclear power found a renaissance. In these circumstances, 
risk theory predicts a regulatory knee-jerk response, potentially 
resulting in inefficient overregulation. But it also suggests 
procedural palliatives that conveniently overlap with 
administrative law values, making room for the engagement of 
the full spectrum of stakeholders. This Article sketches the U.S. 
regulatory response to Fukushima. From a positive perspective, 
this story provides a useful case study for understanding 
administrative agencies’ responses to disasters and the 
concomitant role of risk perception. But this story also invites 
using an administrative law lens to take a fresh look at the 
issues of retroactivity and stakeholder engagement. This Article 
concludes by identifying insights as well as research needs for 
both regulatory responses to disaster and classic administrative 
law.  
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   I. INTRODUCTION  
 The tragic 2011 Tohuku Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan 
presented a familiar scenario from a risk perception standpoint. The 
events combined a classic “dread risk” (radioactivity), a punctuating 
event (the Fukushima nuclear disaster), and resultant stigmatization 
(involving worldwide repercussions for nuclear power). 1  The 
Fukushima disaster revived memories of the Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl disasters and provided a reminder of the global 
interconnectedness of nuclear power. In response, some nations 
curtailed nuclear power generation, and decades-old opposition to 
nuclear power found a renaissance.2 In the United States, Fukushima 
coincided with increasing concerns about spent-fuel policy that 
threatened to dampen recent initiatives aimed at a nuclear 
resurgence.3 
 With much at stake for nuclear power, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) quickly appointed a task force to review its 
regulations and make recommendations in light of lessons learned 
from Fukushima. 4  The resulting Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 
Report concluded that continuing reactor operation would not “pose 
                                                                                                                       
 * Associate Dean for Public Engagement and Professor of Law, The George 
Washington University Law School. This work was prepared in connection with the 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law’s 2015 Symposium, This is Not a Drill: 
Responding to International Disasters. I thank the symposium participants and editors, 
including Lincoln Davies for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft, as well as 
Shirley Qin, GWU Law 2016, for her helpful research assistance. 
 1.  See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCI. 280, 283–84 (1987) [hereinafter 
Slovic, Perception of Risk]. For discussion of these concepts, see infra Part I. 
 2.  See Brian Walsh, Japan Mulls Nuclear Revival Not Even 3 Years After 
Fukushima, TIME (Feb. 25, 2014), http://time.com/9684/japan-mulls-nuclear-revival-
not-even-3-years-after-fukushima/ [http://perma.cc/8V7Z-DFM8] (archived Sept. 4, 
2015) (describing international reactions to Fukushima); see also Lincoln L. Davies, 
Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 
1937, 1938 (2011) (“We flip switches all day long without wondering where our 
electrons come from, and then there is a Chernobyl, or Three Mile Island, or 
Fukushima, and anti-nuclear protestors take to the streets.”). 
 3.  See Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the 
Marketplace, 68 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25, 32), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2584619 [http://perma.cc/MDZ5-9UMK] (archived Sept. 5, 
2015) (providing examples). But see In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(granting writ of mandamus and directing NRC to proceed with its consideration of 
Department of Energy’s Yucca Mountain license application);; Emily Hammond 
Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1763, 1766 (2012) [hereinafter Deference Dilemma] (recounting Obama administration’s 
withdrawal of support for Yucca Mountain).  
 4.  See generally U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N [NRC], 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE 
NEAR–T ERM TASK FORCE REVIEW OF INSIGHTS FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI 
ACCIDENT (July 12, 2011) [hereinafter NTTF REPORT]. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2712258 
an imminent risk to public health and safety.”5 However, it also made 
a number of recommendations, many of which NRC has begun to 
implement. Some of the recommendations and resulting regulatory 
activity are detailed below. For now, the important point is that to 
carry out the NTTF recommendations, NRC issued a series of orders 
modifying existing nuclear power plant licenses.6  
 The prospect of modifying existing licenses—termed 
“backfitting”—raises a host of issues. First, backfitting is a form of 
retroactivity, which is disfavored throughout American law. To be 
sure, there are several types of retroactivity.7 For example, suppose 
NRC were to adopt a rule requiring all existing operators to install 
emergency back-up electricity generation equipment. If NRC also 
imposed penalties for failing to have such equipment prior to the new 
rule’s issuance, it would be imposing new sanctions on past conduct. 
This type of retroactivity is particularly problematic.8 But if NRC 
merely required the equipment going forward, the rule would be only 
“secondar[ily]” retroactive in that it would upset operators’ 
expectations by imposing new costs in connection with existing 
licenses.9 Courts are far more worried about the first category than 
the second. But both have the potential to upset expectations, 
undermine reliance, and destabilize the economic assumptions under 
which regulated entities operate.10  
 Second, backfitting is situated at the intersection of high-stakes 
interests: costs to industry, safety for workers and the public, and 
confidence in the nation’s nuclear agency. Yet it has received scant 
treatment in the courts and scholarly literature.11 The procedures by 
which backfitting is ordered, and the substantive analyses that 
accompany such regulatory action, deserve a closer look. Nuclear 
                                                                                                                       
 5.  Id. at vii. 
 6.  See infra Part II (detailing regulatory response to Fukushima). 
 7.  See William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 106, 109–10; Russell Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations: 
An Analysis of Judicial Responses, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 167 n.1 (1986). 
 8.  See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (rejecting 
retroactive rulemaking authority unless expressly conveyed by Congress). 
 9.  Id. at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 10.  Luneburg, supra note 7, at 110 (noting that variations on retroactivity 
share characteristics including “surprise” and “destabilizing effects”). 
 11.  Only one set of judicial opinions directly examines backfitting. See Union of 
Concerned Scientists v. NRC (Concerned Scientists II), 880 F.2d 552, 555-61 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (upholding revised backfitting rule following remand). A search of Westlaw’s JLR 
database for NRC/p backfit! yields eight articles. For the most directly relevant to the 
topic of this essay, see Peter Huber, The Old–New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. 
L. REV. 1025, 1063–64, 1064 n.180 (1983) (describing preferences for prospective risk 
regulation over retrofitting, citing the backfitting example); Anthony Z. Roisman et al., 
Regulating Nuclear Power in the New Millennium (The Role of the Public), 26 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 317, 333-35 (2009) (arguing the NRC has relied on backfitting too 
infrequently and criticizing one backfitting standard).  
energy is uniquely poised to offer insights for disaster response in 
many different contexts that may call for post hoc regulatory 
adjustments. Indeed, the field is in some sense an ideal laboratory: it 
provides a closed system of regulation, 12  a unified industry, 13  a 
discrete number of regulated units, 14  a comprehensive statutory 
scheme, 15  and a relatively unchanged technology since its first 
deployment.16 
 Yet all these attributes point to a third set of issues lurking 
behind the backfitting model. During the 1970s and 1980s, nuclear 
power construction was famously plagued by delays and cost 
overruns.17 Some of these problems were caused by the need to make 
safety upgrades throughout the three-part licensing process; others 
were caused by litigation; still others related to the overall economy.18 
Certainly Three Mile Island and Chernobyl raised serious safety 
concerns during this same time period. In fact, no new reactors were 
                                                                                                                       
 12.  The Atomic Energy Act places sole authority for nuclear safety with the 
NRC and preempts state and local attempts at regulating that field. See Entergy 
Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding 
Vermont regulatory statutes were preempted by the Atomic Energy Act). But cf. Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 208-
15 (1983) (upholding California law that conditioned nuclear plant construction on 
findings by the state commission and distinguishing other preemption cases). 
 13.  For example, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) provided a unified 
response to Fukushima. See NEI, FUKUSHIMA RESPONSE, http://www.nei.org/Issues-
Policy/Safety-Security/Fukushima-Response (last visited Sept. 5, 2015) [http://perma. 
cc/6GCC-LKFT] (archived Sept. 5, 2015). 
 14.  There are currently ninety-nine reactor units in operation in the United 
States. See NRC, NUCLEAR REACTORS, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/power.html (last 
updated February 18, 2015) [http://perma.cc/EV34-Z2J2] (archived Sept. 5, 2015).  
 15.  The primary scheme is embodied in the Atomic Energy Act [AEA], 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2011–259 (2011). 
 16.  Next-generation reactors are still in the research and development phase. 
A new design certification was issued for the AP1000 reactor design in 2011, which will 
be installed at the Vogtle Units in Georgia. See Design Certification Rule for the 
AP1000 Design, 10 C.F.R. pt. 52, app. D. To be sure, these features of the nuclear field 
also make it exceptional, which raises the possibility that drawing conclusions 
generalizable to other fields could be problematic. For purposes of this Article, 
however, I argue that the features unique to nuclear can also amplify various 
regulatory issues, making them easier to identify and thereby promoting their further 
study in other fields.  
 17.  See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes 
in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1984). 
 18.  For further discussion, see Hammond & Spence, supra note 3, at Part II; 
JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS & THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 401–02 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015). An influential study of 
the economics of nuclear power by the Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT) 
considered many such factors. See MIT, The Future of Nuclear Power: An 
Interdisciplinary MIT Study 38 (2003), http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/ 
nuclearpower-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EBV-X6WB] (archived Sept. 5, 2015); MIT, 
Update of the MIT 2003 Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study 
(2009), http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/V8V2-TPU3] (archived Sept. 5, 2015). 
completed after Chernobyl, save Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts 
Bar 1, which came online in 1996 but had been ordered in 1970.19  
 Despite the many concerns about nuclear power, it fills an 
important need for electricity reliability by providing steady baseload 
power, comprising 20 percent of U.S. electricity generation. Its 
lifecycle carbon emissions are comparable to hydro and wind power, 
making it an important player in climate change policy. 20 And it 
emits none of the criteria pollutants and toxics that plague its 
baseload competitor, coal.21 Of all the electricity fuels, nuclear power 
most comprehensively internalizes negative externalities.22 But this 
puts it at a competitive disadvantage in the wholesale markets—
particularly relative to coal and natural gas-fired generation—and 
several plants have announced closures and plans not to renew their 
licenses. 23  The industry argues that unless there are significant 
market reforms, nuclear power plants will not be economically 
viable.24 In other words, the future of nuclear power is uncertain, and 
the industry’s ability to respond to newly identified safety needs 
while operating economically is only becoming more urgent.25  
                                                                                                                       
 19.  EISEN, supra note 18, at 402. 
 20.  See, e.g., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., DEP’T OF ENERGY, LIFECYCLE 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRICITY GENERATION (2012), http:// 
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/57187.pdf [http://perma.cc/GB4B-5LPC] (archived Sept. 5, 
2015). EPA envisions a role for nuclear power in the Clean Power Plan. See, e.g., 
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830, 34934 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (permitting new nuclear and capacity uprates as eligible for use in 
adjusting CO2 emission rates). 
 21.  See Hammond & Spence, supra note 3, at 17 (describing how coal 
extraction and emissions generate health and safety concerns, as well as water and air 
pollution). See generally Pushker A. Kharecha & James E. Hansen, Prevented Mortality 
and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Historical and Projected Nuclear Power, 47 
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4889 (2013) (modeling deaths prevented by use of nuclear power 
rather than coal). 
 22.  See Hammond & Spence, supra note 3, at Part II.A (providing details and 
comparisons to other fuels). 
 23. See Matthew Wald, Vermont Yankee Plant to Close Next Year as the 
Nuclear Industry Retrenches, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/ science/entergy-announces-closing-of-vermont-
nuclear-plant.html?_r=0 [http://perma. cc/7WYD-6677] (archived Sept. 5, 2015) 
(describing planned retirement of Vermont Yankee and the “rapid decline” of the 
nuclear industry).  
 24.  See News Release, Nuclear Energy Inst., NEI Warns Wall Street Analysts 
of Flawed Electricity Markets (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.nei.org/News-Media/Media-
Room/News-Releases/NEI-Warns-Wall-Street-Analysts-of-Flawed-Electrici 
[http://perma.cc/QM4E-YAPT] (archived Sept. 5, 2015). 
 25.  The policy issues related to spent nuclear fuel are likewise in urgent need 
of attention. See Deference Dilemma, supra note 3, at 1783–90 (describing the history of 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act); see also EISEN, supra note 18, at 437–53 (describing 
legal and policy developments through fall 2014). 
 These many issues are beyond the scope of a single essay.26 My 
modest goals here are twofold. First, I document NRC’s application of 
the backfit rule as a response to Fukushima, drawing from the risk 
perception literature to shed light on this regulatory approach. 
Second, I examine the backfit rule through an administrative law 
lens, focusing on retroactivity and the “administrative law values of 
participation, deliberation, and transparency.” 27  The role of these 
principles is of particular importance in a field where safety is 
paramount, risk perceptions run high, and disasters can never be 
fully predicted. And accounting for administrative law principles 
sheds light on how other regulatory regimes might approach hazard 
mitigation and disaster response in light of lessons learned.28  
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by 
providing a brief overview of the risk perception mechanisms at work 
in nuclear power, linking those mechanisms to nuclear power 
regulation, and describing the regulatory structure for backfitting. 
Part II details the regulatory response to Fukushima, including the 
use of the backfitting rule to date. Part III takes up the 
administrative law concerns that backfitting raises and explores how 
the retroactivity principles fare in this particular regulatory context. 
Part IV identifies links between broad statutory discretion, highly 
detailed regulatory regimes, and deferential judicial oversight that 
can inform the rationality of agency behavior in the wake of disasters. 
II. RISK PERCEPTION AND NUCLEAR RISK REGULATION 
 Basic risk perception principles aid in understanding the 
importance of the nuclear regulatory scheme to public acceptance of 
nuclear power. First, a distinction is helpful. The term “risk” can refer 
to risk assessment, risk perception, and/or risk management. Much of 
the nuclear regulatory scheme implements risk assessment methods, 
which attempt to measure the cumulative likelihood and magnitude 
of various hazards.29 The assessments of risk are used to develop 
                                                                                                                       
 26.  For a more detailed discussion of the economics of nuclear power, see 
generally Hammond & Spence, supra note 3. 
 27.  See Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for 
Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
313, 316–17 (2013) (enumerating values and collecting sources). 
 28.  See also Jacqueline L. Weaver, Offshore Safety in the Wake of the Macondo 
Disaster: The Role of the Regulator, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 379 (2014) (documenting 
massive regulatory shifts following BP-Deepwater Horizon oil spill). 
 29.  See Stanley Kaplan & B. John Garrick, On the Quantitative Definition of 
Risk, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 11, 12–17 (1981) (setting forth a quantitative definition of risk); 
see also Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, Risk and Uncertainty Analysis in Government Safety 
Decisions, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 633, 635–36 (2002) (providing examples of probabilistic 
risk analysis). 
mitigation strategies, which attempt to reduce the likelihood of a 
hazard, its magnitude, or both.30 Part II below provides details on 
how these concepts were implemented post-Fukushima. The ways 
people perceive risk, however, relate to both the extent of any 
regulatory response, and the public’s acceptance of such response. 
This Part provides a brief overview of just a few of the risk perception 
concepts that relate to Fukushima and nuclear power.  
A. Risk Perception and Nuclear Power  
 Decades ago, pioneers of risk perception Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman observed that humans perceive risk in ways that 
deviate from mathematical predictions.31 Indeed, due at least in part 
to their perceptions, humans seldom behave as rational economic 
actors.32 It so happened that risk perception research came of age at 
the same time as atomic energy. As a result, many of the pioneering 
studies of risk perception involved nuclear power.33 
 One such line of research resulted in the theory of the 
psychometric paradigm,34 which categorizes risks according to how 
dreaded35 and how familiar36 they are. Risks that are high-dread and 
low-familiarity are perceived to be the worst, and include nuclear 
power, nuclear waste disposal, and uranium mining.37  People are 
more likely to desire strict regulation for these types of risks. 38 
                                                                                                                       
 30.  See, e.g., NRC, MITIGATION OF BEYOND–DESIGN–BASIS EVENTS 3, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/emergency-
procedures.html [http://perma.cc/QN8Q-JXM5] (archived Sept. 21, 2015) (collecting 
sources).  
 31. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis 
of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263, 265 (1979) [hereinafter Prospect 
Theory]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1130-31 (1974). 
 32.  See generally Prospect Theory, supra note 31. 
 33.  See, e.g., Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical Analysis 
of Nuclear Images of Nevada, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA 107, 128–29 (2001); Paul 
Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts of a High-Level 
Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, 11 RISK ANALYSIS 683, (1991) [hereinafter Slovic, 
Perceived Risk]. See generally Stanley Rothman & S. Robert Lichter, Elite Ideology and 
Risk Perception in Nuclear Energy Policy, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 383 (1987) (testing 
various hypotheses to account for public distrust of nuclear power). 
 34.  See Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 1, at 281. 
 35.  Dread is “catastrophic, hard to prevent, fatal, inequitable, threatening to 
future generations, not easily reduced, increasing, involuntary and [personally] 
threatening . . . .” Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in 
SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: HOW SAFE IS ENOUGH? 181, 199 (Richard C. Schwing & 
Walter A. Albers, Jr. eds., 1980) [hereinafter Slovic, Facts and Fears 1980].  
 36.  Familiarity relates to a risk’s “observability, knowledge, immediacy of 
consequences, and familiarity.” Id.  
 37.  Id. at 203–04 tbl.8. Examples of low-dread, high-familiarity risks include 
bicycles, chainsaws, and trampolines. Id. 
 38.  Id. at 206. 
Moreover, high-dread risks are highly susceptible to affect heuristics; 
that is, given inputs suggesting a high risk (like Fukushima), people 
will infer that the benefit of a particular technology (like nuclear 
power) is low. 39  Punctuating events, like Three Mile Island, 
Chernobyl, and Fukushima, reinforce these notions and contribute to 
even deeper distrust of such technologies.40  
 The implications of such perceptions of nuclear power are many; 
with respect to responses to Fukushima in particular, consider the 
following statement of Paul Slovic: “[B]eliefs about the catastrophic 
nature of nuclear power are a major determinant of public opposition 
to that technology. This is not a comforting conclusion because the 
rarity of catastrophic events makes it extremely difficult to resolve 
disagreements by recourse to empirical evidence.” 41  And as Cass 
Sunstein comments, “Both private and public institutions will 
overreact” in the face of fear.42 In other words, it is very likely that 
incidents such as Fukushima will lead to additional regulatory 
obligations that may well be inefficient.  
 The great difficulty, of course, is determining whether such 
inefficiency exists. Professor Sunstein and others have argued that 
cost-benefit analysis should be at least part of the guard against 
overregulation.43 But as many other scholars have shown, cost-benefit 
analysis is subject to numerous deficiencies of its own.44 Moreover, as 
the Slovic quote above indicates, it is extremely difficult to attach 
analytical numbers to catastrophic events that by definition almost 
                                                                                                                       
 39.  Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts 
about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 315 (2004) 
[hereinafter Slovic, Risk as Analysis]. 
 40.  See Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in 
THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 137, 150–51 (2000) [hereinafter Slovic, Facts and Fears 2000] 
(describing how accidents that signal a breakdown in safety-control systems may 
“greatly enhance perceived risk and trigger strong corrective action”);; see also Roger E. 
Kasperson et al., Stigma and the Social Amplification of Risk: Toward a Framework of 
Analysis, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA 9, 27 (2001).  
 41.  Slovic, Risk as Analysis, supra note 39, at 149. But see Dan M. Kahan et 
al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RESEARCH 147, 175–79 (2011) 
(demonstrating, using cultural cognition theory, that risk perceptions are unlikely to 
change when people are confronted with facts contrary to their cultural worldviews). 
 42.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
206 (2005). 
 43.  Id. at 129; see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 21–29 
(1993). Professor Sunstein is also a leading advocate of libertarian paternalism, which 
is “an approach that preserves freedom of choice but that encourages both private and 
public institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their own welfare.” 
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1201 (2003) (describing and defending libertarian 
paternalism). 
 44.  See, e.g., Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for 
Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 192, 192 n.7 (2004) (raising normative issues and 
collecting sources). 
never happen. And there is another important consideration flowing 
from this very brief overview of risk perception and nuclear power: 
given the deep objections many have against nuclear power, it seems 
problematic—even illegitimate—to say that such objections should be 
dismissed out of hand.45  
 This core issue for legitimacy lies at the intersection of procedure 
and substance, and is at the heart of the U.S. response to Fukushima. 
If it is paternalistic to snub deeply felt concerns about nuclear safety 
by attempting to erase them with cost-benefit analysis, and it is 
counter to the efficiency imperative of regulation to regulate far 
beyond what is necessary, one is left wondering how to respond to a 
disaster in a way that is both fair and efficient. In some sense, this 
question reflects a longstanding conundrum of administrative law 
generally: how best to reconcile the need for efficient government 
with the need for participation, deliberation, and transparency. 46 
Indeed, the issue is even more salient for nuclear disasters, where 
protection of public health and safety is paramount.47  
 It is of great interest, then, that the risk perception literature 
itself suggests process-oriented palliatives. Identity affirmation, 
pluralistic advocacy, and narrative framing are all variables that hold 
potential for increasing individuals’ likelihood of considering 
information more open-mindedly.48 These concepts map neatly onto 
procedural justice considerations—voice, treatment with respect, 
trustworthiness, and neutrality—which in turn dovetail with 
administrative-law values.49 In a field as perception-prone as nuclear 
power, this understanding offers a further utility for administrative 
law as both a critical feature of, and a metric for, legitimacy. 
                                                                                                                       
 45.  Democratic legitimacy, a mainstay of administrative law theory, assumes 
that agencies should attempt to achieve the results that the average voter would seek 
given the opportunity. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for 
the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 99–100 (2000) (devising public choice 
rationale supporting agencies’ democratic legitimacy). Procedural legitimacy, also a 
core component of administrative doctrine, requires, among other things, opportunities 
for voice and treatment with respect. Hammond & Markell, supra note 27, at 323.  
 46.  See Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 
78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 279 (1978) (noting the need to balance these considerations).  
 47.  I assume that the nuclear industry, agency, and the public are aligned 
generally with this view. Of course, they may disagree considerably as to the best way 
to effectuate this goal. Furthermore, the agency and industry are likely aligned in 
recognizing the risks to the industry itself that are posed by nuclear disasters. Neither 
institution, presumably, would want all nuclear plants to halt operation. See Davies, 
supra note 2, at 1985–89. The public, of course, is divided on this issue. See Rebecca 
Riffkin, U.S. Support for Nuclear Energy at 51%, GALLUP.COM, (Mar. 30, 2015), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/182180/support-nuclear-energy.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/UM82-WFZ8] (archived Sept. 6, 2015) (showing historical trends). 
 48.  Kahan, supra note 41, at 33. 
 49.  See Hammond & Markell, supra note 27, at 322–26. 
B. The Nuclear Regulatory Scheme and the Backfitting Rule 
 With these principles in mind, consider the nuclear regulatory 
regime and the backfitting rule—one of NRC’s most powerful tools for 
responding to disasters.50 The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) is “virtually 
unique” in the extent to which the statute lodges broad discretion 
with the agency.51 With respect to developing licensing requirements, 
NRC is authorized to require “such . . . information” as it “may, by 
rule or regulation, deem necessary” in order to determine whether the 
nuclear facility’s technical specifications “will provide adequate 
protection to the health and safety of the public.”52 When NRC sets 
adequate protection standards, it may not consider the role of cost, 
but it can consider other factors like the nature of the risks 
involved.53 Even so, adequate protection does not require zero risk; 
rather, it necessitates “reasonable assurance that a nuclear reactor 
could be safely operated.”54 NRC may also impose additional safety 
measures beyond adequate protection, and in doing so is authorized—
and does—consider the costs and benefits of such measures.55  
 Nuclear power plants must comply with NRC’s defense-in-depth 
philosophy, which relies on a multilayered system of fail-safes and 
backup planning to employ both active and passive protections in the 
event that something goes wrong. Moreover, plants must be prepared 
for “design-basis events”—anticipated operational events as well as 
accidents, for which mitigation technology and strategies must be 
deployed.56 The design-basis approach is informally equated with the 
legal requirement of “adequate protection.”57 By comparison, beyond-
                                                                                                                       
 50.  There are several types of backfits. This Article is concerned with those 
needed to ensure adequate protection and those providing safety enhancements. See 10 
C.F.R. § 50.109 (1986).  
 51.  Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1968);; see 
also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRC, 598 F.2d 759, 771 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 52.  42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2015).  
 53.  Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 2009); see Union of 
Concerned Scientists v. NRC (Concerned Scientists I), 824 F.2d 108, 114–18 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (providing discussion). Thus, the adequate protection standard is distinguishable 
from many other statutory mandates involving risk regulation. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. 
v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 223 (2009) (upholding EPA’s consideration of cost for 
cooling water intake structures under Clean Water Act); cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 469–70, 471 (2001) (finding no consideration of costs in developing 
NAAQS, but identifying other Clean Air Act provisions expressly contemplating cost). 
 54.  Carstens v. NRC, 742 F.2d 1546, 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Nader v. 
Ray, 363 F. Supp. 946, 954 (D.D.C. 1973) (rejecting “complete,” “entire,” or “perfect” 
assurance of safety as the standard for issuing facility operating licenses). 
 55.  Pub. Citizen, 573 F.3d at 918–19. 
 56.  This concept has been employed since the licensing of some of the earliest 
reactors in the 1960s and 1970s. NTTF Report, supra note 4, at 15. The current design 
certification approach to licensing (see 10 C.F.R. § 52 (2015)) takes a probabilistic risk 
assessment approach. See id. at 17 (describing distinction).  
 57.  Id. at 15. 
design-basis events are informally equated with safety 
enhancements, that is, requirements beyond adequate protection that 
would be mandated only if their benefits outweighed their costs.58  
 The backfitting process maps onto this framework in the 
following ways. First, backfitting is defined as “the modification of or 
addition to systems, structures, components, or design of a 
facility; . . . which may result from a new or amended provision in the 
Commission’s regulations or the imposition of a regulatory staff 
position interpreting the Commission’s regulations that is either new 
or different from a previously applicable staff position.”59 Relevant 
here, NRC shall impose backfitting requirements on existing 
licensees without regard to cost if “necessary to ensure that the 
facility provides adequate protection.”60 If the agency issues such a 
backfitting order, it must provide “appropriate documented 
evaluation,” including the objectives of, and reasons for, the 
modification.61 Additional safety measures may be ordered through 
the backfitting procedure if the NRC determines that there will be a 
“substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and 
safety” and that the costs are justified by the increased protection.62 
The applicable regulations provide a list of factors to consider.63  
 The history of NRC’s approach to backfitting provides insights 
into its modern operation. The original rule, promulgated in 1970, 
attracted criticism from nuclear watchdogs for its failure to establish 
a systematic method of assessing needed upgrades, particularly in the 
wake of the Three Mile Island accident.64 On the other hand, industry 
critics charged that NRC implemented the rule haphazardly, 
resulting in billions of dollars of costs to consumers and contributing 
to the legendary cost overruns of nuclear construction in the 1970s 
and early 1980s.65 NRC attempted to address this concern in a 1985 
revision to the rule, a major component of which required that the 
                                                                                                                       
 58.  Id.  
 59.  50 C.F.R. § 50.109 (2015). 
 60.  50 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(4)(ii); see also § 50.109(a)(5) (“The Commission shall 
always require the backfitting of a facility if it determines that such regulatory action 
is necessary to ensure . . . adequate protection”). This provision is framed as an 
exemption from a backfit analysis. Actions to ensure compliance with existing 
regulations are also exempt from a backfit analysis. § 50.109(a)(4).  
 61.  50 C.F.R. §§ 50.109(a)(4), (6). 
 62.  50 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(3). 
 63.  50 C.F.R. § 50.109(c). 
 64.  Union of Concerned Scientists. v. NRC (Concerned Scientists I), 824 F.2d 
108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
 65.  Id. (collecting sources); see also Dean C. Dunlavey, Government Regulation 
of Atomic Industry, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 295, 331 (1957) (providing comprehensive, 
contemporaneous review of AEA of 1954, and noting early industry concerns about 
costliness of backfitting orders). 
benefits of a backfit must justify the costs.66 The D.C. Circuit vacated 
the rule, 67  and on remand NRC made clear that the adequate 
protection standard would never consider costs; however, additional 
safety measures not needed for adequate protection would be subject 
to a cost-benefit analysis.68 For those additional safety measures, the 
agency must determine “that there is a substantial increase in the 
overall protection of the public health and safety or the common 
defense and security to be derived from the backfit and that the direct 
and indirect costs of implementation for that facility are justified in 
view of this increased protection.”69 
 NRC has issued a guidance document further explaining the 
backfitting process and instructing staff on how to implement the 
backfit rule.70 The document dedicates considerable attention to when 
a backfit analysis is needed, perhaps reflecting the difficulties posed 
by a standard—adequate protection—that lacks a set definition. 
Indeed, commenters to the backfit rule reflected this concern, some of 
which worried that every improvement would be subject to cost-
benefit analysis, and others of which worried that no improvements 
would be so analyzed.71  
 Given these competing concerns, one might wonder what 
procedural protections are available. Regulated entities have the 
ability to challenge such orders within twenty days.72 Persons who 
are not licensees must make a specific showing why their interests 
are adversely affected, addressing criteria set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 
2.309(d). This code provision is directed generally to hearing requests, 
petitions to intervene, and standing requirements, the last of which is 
the subject of subsection (d). To request to intervene, the requestor 
                                                                                                                       
 66.  See 10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(3); Concerned Scientists I, 824 F.2d at 111 
(reprinting and describing operative language). 
 67.  Concerned Scientists I, 824 F.2d at 552. 
 68.  See Union of Concerned Scientists. v. NRC (Concerned Scientists II), 880 
F.2d 552, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing revisions on remand). This case arose in 
the early post-Chevron years, in which some courts took INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421 (1987), to direct that Chevron did not apply to pure questions of statutory 
interpretations. Concerned Scientists I, 824 F.2d at 113. That view, of course, has not 
prevailed. Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing At All: The 
Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 67–73 (2013). However, this 
meant that the Concerned Scientists I court failed to analyze NRC’s interpretation 
under Chevron principles. Concerned Scientists I, 824 F.2d at 113. 
 69.  10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(3). 
 70.  U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS AND 
EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA, BACKFITTING GUIDELINES NUREG-1409 (July, 
1990), http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0322/ML032230247.pdf [http:// perma.cc/T8W3-
BVDK] (archived Sept.1, 2015). 
 71.  See Final Rule, Revision of Backfitting Process for Power Reactors, 53 Fed. 
Reg. 20,603, 20,605 (1988) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50) (describing opposite concerns of 
Union of Concerned Scientists and industry group). 
 72.  10 C.F.R. § 2.202 (2015). Interested governmental entities may participate 
in proceedings pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c) (2015). 
must show a statutory right to be made a party or describe a 
property, financial, or other interest. 73  Even if the minimal 
requirements for standing are met, however, a prospective intervener 
must raise a valid contention.74 Contentions must materially relate to 
the scope of the proceeding.75 Because these proceedings are highly 
technical, these requirements for intervention present a high barrier 
to entry. In sum, regulated entities have much greater procedural 
access to argue that a backfit order goes too far than do interested 
parties who might argue that a backfit order is inadequate. As 
exemplified by the regulatory response to Fukushima, this tilt 
appears pervasive.  
III. THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO FUKUSHIMA 
 Following Fukushima, NRC convened a Near-Term Task Force 
(NTTF) to identify lessons learned, conduct a comprehensive review 
of NRC regulations, and make recommendations. In particular, the 
Task Force focused on risks posed by natural phenomena, how NRC 
has historically protected against such risks, and how NRC has 
handled events beyond the design basis of existing plants. 76  As 
mentioned previously, the NTTF’s July 12, 2011 report concluded 
that continuing to both operate existing plants and engage in 
licensing activities would not “pose an imminent risk to public health 
and safety.”77 However, it also recommended an overhaul of NRC’s 
regulatory framework to provide a more systematic and 
comprehensive set of rules for ensuring adequate protection. 78 
Further, it recommended actions directed at (1) reevaluation of 
seismic and flooding risks; (2) enhancing mitigation capabilities, 
particularly for station blackouts, venting, spent fuel pool 
instrumentation, and emergency response capabilities; (3) emergency 
                                                                                                                       
 73.  10 C.F.R. § 309(d) (2015). 
 74.  See Conn. Coal. Against Millstone v. NRC, 114 Fed. Appx. 36, 38–39 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that NRC improperly denied motion to 
intervene, where petitioner had “shown little knowledge of the technical issues 
pertaining to the proposed license amendment”) (quoting In re Dominion Nuclear 
Conn., 58 N.R.C. 207, 219 (2003)).  
 75.  See Blue Ridge Envtl. Def. League v. NRC, 716 F.3d 183, 197, 199 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (rejecting petitioners’ challenge to NRC’s denial of contentions regarding 
Vogtle licensing where, inter alia, contentions provided no explanations of how NTTF 
Report raised previously unaddressed issues, and where contentions lacked specific 
links between Fukushima and Vogtle site).  
 76.  See generally NTTF Report, supra note 4. 
 77.  Id. at vii. 
 78.  Id. at 15–23.  
preparedness; and (4) improved oversight of licensee safety 
performance.79  
 Following the NTTF Report, NRC staff had “interactions with 
stakeholders”80 and developed two reports, the first recommending 
actions to be taken without delay,81 and the second recommending 
prioritization of such actions. 82  Although NRC agreed with the 
NTTF’s determination that there was no imminent risk, 83  it 
determined that adequate protection required additional 
requirements for licensees and construction permit holders.84 
 The agency thus issued a series of backfit orders to modify 
existing licenses with respect to mitigation strategies, 85  venting 
systems for certain containment designs, 86  and spent fuel pool 
instrumentation. 87  The activity associated with venting systems 
illustrates the nuances that may arise. The original Venting Order, 
EA-12-050 (Mar. 12, 2012), required licensees with Mark I or Mark II 
containments88 to install reliable hardened venting systems to ensure 
adequate protection. 89  Venting Order I emphasized that at 
Fukushima, operators’ inability to successfully operate the 
containment venting system early during the event made it more 
difficult to cool the reactor core, leading to “extensive core damage, 
high radiation levels, hydrogen production, and containment 
failure.”90 After noting substantial variance among hardened vents in 
the United States, the order stated simply that reliable hardened 
                                                                                                                       
 79.  Id. at ix. 
 80.  See, e.g., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances (N.R.C), Order 
Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents, EA-12-050, 
at 3 (Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Venting Order I]. 
 81.  R.W. BORCHARDT, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, SECY-11-0124, 
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WITHOUT DELAY FROM THE NEAR-TERM TASK 
FORCE REPORT (2011). 
 82.  R.W. BORCHARDT, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, SECY-11-0137, 
PRIORITIZATION OF RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO FUKUSHIMA 
LESSONS LEARNED (2011). 
 83.  Id. at 2. 
 84.  See id. at 4. 
 85.  See generally U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances (N.R.C.), 
Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for 
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, EA-12-049 (Mar. 12, 2012). 
86 See generally Venting Order I, supra note 80. 
 87.  See generally U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances (N.R.C), 
Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, 
EA-12-051 (Mar. 12, 2012). Numerous other regulatory activities are detailed at NRC, 
Japan Lessons Learned, NRC (last updated Jan. 2015), http://www.nrc.gov/ 
reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard.html [http://perma.cc/AW5N-DQX7] 
(archived Sept. 21, 2015).  
 88.  Venting Order I, supra note 80, at 3.  
 89.  Id. at 4. 
 90.  Id. at 3. 
venting systems are needed to ensure adequate protection. 91  By 
contrast, the order explained that the issue whether to also require 
filtered vents—which would address concerns about the release of 
radioactive materials if venting systems were used during an 
accident—required resolution of “policy issues” that would be further 
evaluated by staff.92  
 Later that same year, NRC staff presented an analysis of the 
costs and benefits associated with requiring upgradable hardened 
vents as well as hardened vents with filtration systems.93 For the 
latter, the analysis concluded that the quantitative costs ($15 to $20 
million per reactor unit) outweighed the quantitative benefits. 94 
Nevertheless, staff recommended that filtered vents be installed:  
A comparison of only the quantifiable costs and benefits of the proposed 
modifications, if considered safety enhancements, would not, by 
themselves, demonstrate that the benefits exceed the associated costs. 
However, when qualitative factors such as the importance of 
containment systems within the NRC’s defense-in-depth philosophy are 
considered, as is consistent with Commission direction, a decision to 
require the installation of engineered filtered vent systems is 
justified.95 
 The full document includes a backfit analysis. 96  Notably, 
following industry complaints that costs of compliance would be too 
high, members of Congress asked the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to investigate and report on NRC’s cost estimating 
methods generally, and its 2012 filtered venting system estimate 
specifically.97 GAO’s report, issued in 2014, concluded that the cost 
estimate was “not reliable because it did not fully or substantially 
meet any of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate.”98  
 Meanwhile, NRC issued a new Venting Order on June 6, 2013, 
superseding the first, and modifying licenses to require that the 
reliable hardened vents would not only help prevent core damage, but 
                                                                                                                       
 91.  Id. at 4. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See generally R.W. BORCHARDT, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 
SECY-12-0157, CONSIDERATION OF ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTAINMENT 
VENTING SYSTEMS FOR BOILING WATER REACTORS WITH MARK I AND MARK II 
CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES (Nov. 26, 2012) [hereinafter STAFF ADDITIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS]. The NRC is not required by statute, regulation, or executive order to 
undertake a regulatory analysis, but it has been doing so voluntarily since 1976. U.S. 
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [GAO], GAO-15-98, NRC NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS COST 
ESTIMATES BY INCORPORATING MORE BEST PRACTICES (Dec. 2014), at 6 [hereinafter 
GAO REPORT]. 
 94.  The industry expressed concern that costs would be much higher. GAO 
REPORT, supra note 93, at 3. 
 95.  STAFF ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 93, at 2. 
 96.  See id. at 8 (citing Backfit Guidance Document). 
 97.  GAO REPORT, supra note 93, at 3–4. 
 98.  Id. at 15. 
also function after core damage has already occurred (that is, in 
severe accident conditions). 99  Venting Order II incorporated the 
adequate protection provisions of the first order, but it added the 
post-core-damage protection as a cost-justified safety enhancement, 
relying on other portions of the staff’s backfitting analysis. 100 
Acknowledging that venting under such circumstances could lead to 
release of radioactive materials, the agency also directed staff to 
pursue filtered systems via the rulemaking process—apparently 
backing away from the position espoused in the staff analysis 
above.101  
 Thereafter, an industry working group under the Nuclear 
Energy Institute (NEI) developed a guidance document for 
implementing the modified order for NRC review.102 NRC staff held 
several public meetings, provided its own comments, and, after a few 
revisions from NEI, issued a draft guidance document for public 
comment.103 After a series of public meetings and further comments 
(including from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards), staff 
issued a final guidance document for complying with the modified 
order.104 
 This example—only one of the numerous activities responding to 
Fukushima—provides a flavor of the many regulatory iterations 
involved in reacting to a disaster. Although the NTTF Report issued 
quickly following Fukushima, it took several years to develop 
compliance criteria for the backfitting orders, and rulemakings are 
still underway. Of interest, in March 2015, Senate Republicans issued 
a letter to NRC requesting that the agency fold ongoing Fukushima 
investigations into its existing workload.105 In particular, the letter 
cautioned NRC not to repeat post-Three Mile Island mistakes by 
failing to subject proposed requirements to structured review, risk 
prioritization, and cost-benefit analysis. It criticized the experience 
with the venting orders (recall that initially, NRC staff recommended 
                                                                                                                       
 99.  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances (N.R.C), Order Modifying 
Licenses With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation 
Under Severe Accident Conditions, EA–13–109, at 5 (June 6, 2013) [hereinafter 
Venting Order II]. 
 100.  Id. at 6–7.  
 101.  Id. at 9. 
 102.  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances (N.R.C), Compliance with 
Order EA–13–109, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened 
Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions, JLD-ISG-
2013-02, at 2 (Nov. 14, 2013). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 2–3. 
 105.  Letter from Sen. Jim Inhoffe, U.S. S. Envtl. & Pub. Works Comm., to the 
Hon. Stephen G. Burns, NRC (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.epw.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm/press-releases-republican?ID=019C9287-BC15-25E6-AD61-
8D6F2560A35A [http://perma.cc/T3SJ-9TV9] (archived Sept. 21, 2015).  
requiring filters even though the quantitative costs outweighed the 
benefits) and endorsed NRC’s ultimate decision to consider that issue 
in a rulemaking proceeding: “[NRC’s] actions regarding external 
filters is, once again, a stark reminder that disciplined regulatory and 
cost benefit analysis provide a basis for distinguishing between 
matters that are truly safety-significant and those that merely 
appear so.”106  
 Throughout the Fukushima response, the level of engagement by 
the regulated community is notable. Not only did that community 
provide comments and attend meetings, but it also developed the 
compliance criteria that NRC ultimately adopted. Moreover, the 
congressional activity—from the GAO Report to the letter above—
reflected concerns that the regulatory response was perhaps 
exceeding efficient levels, as the risk perception literature might have 
predicted. The next section takes up retroactivity as a framing device 
for such concerns.   
IV. RETROACTIVITY AND PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A. Retroactivity 
 As demonstrated by the controversy regarding filtered vents, 
backfitting requirements can impose significant costs on nuclear 
operators by changing the legal framework and expectations within 
which they are already operating. Such orders are adjudicatory in the 
sense that they apply legal standards to a given set of facts, reaching 
specified licensees.107 On the other hand, to the extent they also apply 
generally and hold future effect, they operate like rules.108 Regardless 
of the characterization, the sort of retroactivity involved in the 
Fukushima backfitting orders is almost certainly unproblematic.  
 By their nature, cases addressing retroactivity take up the issue 
from the regulated entity’s point of view;; thus, courts frame the 
“principle concerns” of retroactivity as “lack of notice and the degree 
of reliance on former standards.” 109  The test of retroactivity for 
                                                                                                                       
 106.  Id. It seems clear that the letter was motivated by concern that the 
regulated industry bears too many unjustified costs. See id. (requesting information on 
additional regulatory requirements that have been imposed over the last five years, 
beyond backfits). 
 107.  See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2015) (including licensing within the definition of 
order). 
 108.  See id. § 551(4) (defining rule). 
 109.  Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n 
[FERC], 826 F.2d 1074, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Mikva, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 
1972)). 
adjudicative policymaking balances the retroactive effect “against the 
mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design 
or to legal and equitable principles.”110 For retroactive rulemaking, 
we have already seen the critical distinction: rules that impose “new 
sanctions on past conduct”111 must be expressly authorized,112 while 
rules that only “upset expectations” are termed “secondarily 
retroactive” and are subject to the arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard. 113  The focus of an arbitrary-and-capricious review of 
secondarily retroactive agency action is on balancing the benefits and 
burdens of the action.114  
 The upshot is that the reason-giving requirement for 
adjudicative retroactivity is similar to that for secondarily retroactive 
rules: agencies must explain why the balancing of harms and benefits 
favors retroactivity; the failure to consider prospective application 
can be arbitrary and capricious.115 These standards are not likely 
problematic for backfitting because of the larger statutory framework. 
First, the adequate protection standard expressly contemplates 
license modifications, putting licensees on notice of secondary 
retroactivity. As for adjudicatory retroactivity, the usual retroactivity 
challenge arises from a procedural claim—that the agency should 
have regulated by rule rather than by adjudication. But the premise 
to this argument is that if the agency were to operate by rule, it 
would apply its policy only prospectively (in contrast to the partial 
retroactivity common to adjudication). NRC would likely fail to 
comply with its statutory mandate if it chose to regulate only 
prospectively after having determined that adequate protection 
necessitated a particular practice or technology. And this is to say 
nothing of the substantive balancing that a retroactivity analysis 
would entail: even millions of dollars to the regulated industry is not 
likely going to win against the public benefit of “adequate protection” 
or even additional safety enhancements.  
                                                                                                                       
 110.  SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). 
 111.  Nat’l Petrochemicals & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 630 F.3d 145, 159 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
 112.  See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–12 (1988). 
 113.  Id. at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 
567 F.3d 659, 670–71 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 
244, 269–70 (finding that, for statutes, retroactivity does not encompass the mere upset 
of expectations that were based in prior law). 
 114.  See Nat’l Petrochemicals & Refiners Ass’n, 630 F.3d at 166 (noting agency 
decided there was adequate lead time, obligated parties had received adequate notice, 
and other approaches were problematic); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 567 F.3d at 
670–71 (determining that the agency carefully balanced benefits and burdens of 
applying rule to render certain existing contracts unenforceable).  
 115.  Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074, 1094 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Mikva, J., dissenting); Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 
794 F.2d 737, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  
B. Principles of Administrative Law and Stakeholder Engagement 
 For industry challenging a backfit, is there anything to be made 
of the breadth of the statutory mandate? A nondelegation challenge is 
almost certain to fail. 116  As for the agency’s substantive 
interpretation of the mandate, some scholars have suggested that 
agencies should set standards that limit their discretion, setting forth 
principles, for example, that would guide their decision making in 
particular cases.117 But it is not difficult to see why the backfit rule is 
particularly hard to cabin with a forward-looking definition of 
“adequate protection.” The mechanism has been invoked as a 
response to events that by definition were not foreseen; they are not 
part of the design basis for licensing ex ante.  
 Many scholars have argued that the best way to police agencies’ 
behavior is through the ex post oversight supplied by judicial review 
and political checks.118 On the surface, one might conclude that the 
backfit context makes judicial review all the more important because 
backfitting offers less in the way of ex ante participation and 
deliberation, at least compared to traditional rulemaking. Certainly 
this objection seems to be at the heart of the congressional letter 
above. Further, the traditional accounts of both secondary 
retroactivity and dread risks emphasize the potential for agency 
overreaching, enhance the importance of procedure in mitigating such 
behavior, and rely on judicial review to incentivize agencies to 
mitigate unfairness to regulated entities.119  
 But there are countervailing considerations. The traditional 
account of agency capture predicts that agencies will settle on 
positions less responsive to the public interest because they receive 
most of their information from the regulated industry and are 
incentivized to avoid litigation with the groups that most likely 
                                                                                                                       
 116.  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 457–73 (2001) 
(collecting examples of broadly worded statutory mandates that meet the “intelligible 
principle” standard). 
 117.  See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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curing an unlawful delegation through a limiting interpretation. Cf. Whitman, 531 U.S. 
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 119.  See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE & 
PRACTICE 326 (5th ed. 2014) (suggesting agencies can avoid retroactivity problems like 
those in Retail, Wholesale by issuing cease-and-desist orders rather than imposing 
financial penalties). 
threaten appeals.120 As Professor Wendy Wagner has observed, this is 
of particular concern in highly technical, specialized areas of law, 
where—even if regulators are opposed to skewed outcomes—the 
issues “are so technical and complicated that in practice they take 
place at an altitude that is out of the range of vision of the full set of 
normally engaged and affected parties.”121 Moreover, these concerns 
are reinforced when courts review agency exercises of discretion in 
light of a permissive statutory mandate in highly technical fields. 
“Super deference,”122 which instructs that courts should be at their 
“most deferential” when reviewing agency actions at the “frontiers of 
science,”123 undermines accountability by glossing over the details of 
agency reasoning.124  
 Consider again the particulars of the Fukushima response. 
Certainly NRC responded quickly—as would be predicted by risk 
theory and as appropriate given the high stakes. 125  Further, the 
backfitting orders issued for adequate protection did not need cost-
benefit analyses, suggesting the potential for overreaching. It is, of 
course, impossible here to ascertain whether overreaching actually 
happened, but it is notable that no regulated entities used the 
procedures for challenging the adequate-protection backfitting.126 On 
the other hand, the regulated industry appears to have used other 
means of influencing the results, as illustrated by the filtered vent 
issue—raising concerns directly with NRC and perhaps bringing 
congressional oversight to bear—with the result that NRC shifted 
away from backfitting and toward rulemaking.  
 A brief look at the opportunities for stakeholder engagement is 
also useful. One set of stakeholders, of course, is the regulated 
industry itself, which has been very actively engaged in developing 
applicable standards. Not only is this evident from NEI’s role in 
drafting compliance standards, but it also is apparent from a brief 
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review of the rosters of the public meetings NRC has held.127 This is 
not to suggest anything untoward; certainly the industry has some of 
the best information about the options for, and feasibility of, 
compliance. The participation of those directly regulated by NRC is 
indeed necessary to the legitimacy of the regulatory exercise. 
 Still, one wonders where the other stakeholders are, particularly 
given the special risk characteristics of nuclear power and the 
sustained opposition to the industry that has existed for decades. 
They did not challenge the backfitting orders, and it would have been 
difficult to do so because of the technical showings that would be 
required to intervene. The regulatory dockets show little public 
interest group or community involvement in the “interactions with 
stakeholders” referenced by NRC. Instead, such groups have focused 
their efforts on petitions for rulemaking,128 the courts,129 Congress,130 
and the media. 131  With respect to petitions for rulemaking, that 
approach is notoriously unsuccessful. 132 The courts are difficult to 
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predict; as noted above, there is strong line of super deference in 
nuclear power decisions, but there are occasional examples of much 
harder-look review.133 Congress has proven to be an effective forum 
for major policy debates, as demonstrated by its involvement in 
overseeing NRC’s cost-benefit analysis and certainly by its role in 
inhibiting the progress of Yucca Mountain. 134  And of course, the 
media actively participates in the nuclear policy debate. 
 But therein lies an important administrative law lesson of the 
Fukushima response. Stakeholder debate is robust at the policy level, 
but when it comes to actually formulating the technical and scientific 
data, options, and standards, the field of nuclear power leans heavily 
toward agency-industry dialogue. The industry-capture literature 
relies strongly on administrative procedure to counteract the 
potential ills of such a scenario, but as noted here, neither traditional 
administrative procedure nor the ultimate promise of judicial review 
offers meaningful checks. And with fewer stakeholder perspectives on 
the science and technology of nuclear power and safety engaged in 
actual decision making, the nuclear power discussion lurches toward 
policy arguments and political stalemates. This speaks to a frequent 
lament in regulatory policy more broadly—with administrative law as 
“bloodsport”135 and congressional gridlock becoming only deeper,136 
significant pressure is placed on agencies to do the best they can.137 
 It is hard to prescribe a way for agencies to directly increase the 
scope of technical expertise among interested parties. After all, it can 
take an individual physicist or engineer years to develop expertise, 
particularly the kind borne of direct experience with nuclear power or 
materials. It is not to be expected that an interested observer of 
nuclear safety would have the same kind of experience and access to 
information. But perhaps one area for improvement lies in the 
avenues for public-interest stakeholders to gain a seat at the table. 
The risk perception literature predicts greater open-mindedness 
about risks where parties perceive pluralistic discussion. 138  The 
procedural justice literature also predicts greater acceptance of 
ultimate decisions when participants are offered a voice, respect, and 
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trustworthy and neutral decision makers.139 And the administrative 
law literature predicts better decisions and improved legitimacy for 
agencies that can enhance participation, deliberation, and 
transparency.140  
 Can agencies find new ways to achieve these things? Certainly. 
As Professor David Markell and I have documented, an agency can 
further its “inside-out” 141  legitimacy by voluntarily engaging in 
legitimizing behavior, notwithstanding other procedural 
obligations.142 A variety of informal mechanisms can promote such 
behavior, even when statutory mandates otherwise prescribe certain 
procedural requirements. Indeed, agency culture and professionalism 
can spur innovations,143 and there is likely potential to leverage the 
relationships developed at the regional and state level to better create 
meaningful stakeholder engagement and, ultimately, results that 
match the intent of the statutory mandate. 144  More research is 
needed to identify ways to operationalize these general approaches, 
as is a more meaningful commitment from agencies themselves to 
improve in this regard. But the need for both—particularly in fields 
where dread risks can manifest as disasters—is critical. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Disaster requires response—both on the ground and within our 
legal systems. A nuclear disaster, moreover, invites fears about the 
safety of the nuclear fleet worldwide. NRC’s quick approach to 
identifying lessons learned from Fukushima illustrates how a 
regulatory agency might structure disaster response in the face of 
significant risk—and risk perception. This Article has applied an 
administrative law lens to that response, considering issues of 
fairness, retroactivity, agency capture, and stakeholder engagement. 
While the regulated industry has worked very closely with NRC in 
formulating new standards, the numerous technical barriers to 
participation have shifted other stakeholders’ attention away from 
the standard-setting process and into more policy-oriented venues. 
This dynamic stands to further polarize public opinion at a time when 
much is at stake for nuclear power. Emerging research suggests ways 
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forward; this Article concludes with the hope that further work 
toward stakeholder inclusion will only improve regulatory disaster 
response in the future.  
